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While the statistical and resilience properties of the Internet are no more changing significantly
across time, the Darknet, a network devoted to keep anonymous its traffic, still experiences rapid
changes to improve the security of its users. Here, we study the structure of the Darknet and we
find that its topology is rather peculiar, being characterized by non-homogenous distribution of
connections – typical of scale-free networks –, very short path lengths and high clustering – typical
of small-world networks – and lack of a core of highly connected nodes.
We propose a model to reproduce such features, demonstrating that the mechanisms used to
improve cyber-security are responsible for the observed topology. Unexpectedly, we reveal that its
peculiar structure makes the Darknet much more resilient than the Internet – used as a benchmark
for comparison at a descriptive level – to random failures, targeted attacks and cascade failures, as
a result of adaptive changes in response to the attempts of dismantling the network across time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since when Internet became a publicly accessible in-
frastructure and communication network, its resilience
to random failures – caused, for instance, by unexpected
crashes due to nodes’ malfunction or protocol’s errors – or
attack – actions devoted to isolate nodes that play a vital
role in the network – has been widely investigated[1–5].
In fact, the Internet exhibits highly nontrivial structural
and dynamical properties, from heavy-tail distribution
of connections – known as scale-free property[6] – to a
moderate amount of clustering – proportional to the frac-
tion of nodes that form closed triangles –, whose model-
ing has been the subject of intense research activity[7–
11]. In fact, several years after the Internet first proper
crash, in 1980, the focus of many studies has been, and
still is, to improve its resilience[10, 12–17]. In late 90s,
about 30 years after the first Internet prototype, the US
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
and the Office of Naval Research started to develop a
communication network, at the application layer, based
on anonymous connections and, in principle, resistant to
both eavesdropping and traffic analysis[18]. This net-
work was based on onion routing, a special infrastructure
for private communications over a public network that is
able to hide the content of a message and the identity of
peers who are exchanging it[19]. Nowadays, this infras-
tructure is better known as Tor network and represents
the backbone of the Darknet, an Web of hidden services
that are not reachable from within the Internet. The
Darknet turned out to be the most suitable communica-
tion network to exchange sensitive information, both licit
and illicit, becoming soon the target of governments try-
ing to identify dissidents or of intelligence agencies, such
as CIA and GCHQ[20], to contain unauthorized news
leaks, distribution of illegal contents or trade of illegal
substances.
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Here, we characterize the structural properties of the
Darknet across time, from 2013 to 2015, and we compare
them against the Internet topology. It is worth remark-
ing that throughout the manuscript we model and char-
acterize the Darknet from a complex system perspective,
meaning that we attach to the representation of both the
Internet and the Darknet from available data, while fo-
cusing the study on the particular networks structures
they provide. Note that this comparison is performed at
a descriptive level, using the structure of the Internet as a
benchmark to highlight the salient features of the Dark-
net. The Autonomous Systems data capture connections
at the Internet layer (IP packages), while Tor works on
the application layer, which means that is built on top of
the Internet and transport layers. We propose a model,
based on how Tor functions, to reproduce with high ac-
curacy the most salient characteristics of the Darknet.
Finally, we perform a thorough analysis, based on simula-
tions, of the resilience of both networks to three different
types of failures, static – due to random disruptions or
targeted attacks[1] – and dynamical – due to the cascade
failures induces by attacking a single specific node of the
network[21, 22], and show that the Darknet is much more
robust than the Internet under any perspective.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA SETS
For our analysis, we use publicly available data sets for
both the Internet and the Darknet. The Internet topol-
ogy, at the level of autonomous systems (AS), is sampled
from historical AS-level topology data derived from Bor-
der Gateway Protocol (BGP) monthly snapshots, con-
sisting of IPv4 and IPv6 links appearing between differ-
ent endpoints during that month. The data are hosted
by the UCLA Computer Science Department’s Internet
Research Lab[23].
The Darknet topology is sampled from the data ob-
tained by probing the Tor network to improve its
performance[24]. The links between endpoints are ex-
tracted from the chain of circuits built by Tor clients to
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2probe the network. The network is directed, but we will
treat it as undirected, in the following. The full raw data
are available upon request and a partial release can be
downloaded from a public repository[25]. Although such
data were obtained to study the performance of the Tor
network and not its topology, they provide the best ap-
proximation to the underlying topology of the Darknet
to date.
In both cases, we have been able to build three tem-
poral snapshots, corresponding to the networks in De-
cember 2013, May 2014 and January 2015. The Internet
network snapshots have 46,462, 47,626 and 49,635 nodes
with 195,446, 204,254 and 221,470 connections, in the
three periods, respectively. The Darknet network snap-
shots have 5,921, 4,953 and 5,535 nodes with 2,017,542,
536,287 and 274,831 connections, in the three periods, re-
spectively. The structure of both networks for the 2015
period is shown in Fig.1A.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DARKNET
A. Characterizing the Darknet topology
Let us indicate with A
[ξ]
ij (t) the entries of the adjacency
matrix of each network (ξ = Internet and Darknet) at
time t (t = 2013, 2014 and 2015), with value equal to
one if i and j are connected, and zero otherwise (here
i, j = 1, 2, ..., N [ξ](t), where N indicates the number of
nodes in the network and E the number of edges).
For any node i in each network, we calculate the de-
gree k
[ξ]
i (t) =
∑
j
A
[ξ]
ij (t) – characterizing the number of
connections of each node – and the local clustering co-
efficient c
[ξ]
i (t) – characterizing the tendency of nodes to
form triangles –, defined by the ratio between the num-
ber of closed triangles involving node i and the maximum
number of triangles 12k
[ξ]
i (t)[k
[ξ]
i (t) − 1] node i might be
part of. The mean degree is defined by k¯[ξ](t) = 〈k[ξ]i (t)〉,
whereas the average local clustering coefficient if given
by c¯[ξ](t) = 〈c[ξ]i (t)〉. Another macroscopic structural
descriptor of interest is the global clustering coefficient
C [ξ](t), defined by the ratio between the total number
of closed triplets and the total number of connected
triplets of nodes in the network. In general, the values of
c¯[ξ](t) and C [ξ](t) are different for networks with a non-
homogeneous connectivity. Throughout the analysis no
power-law fitting is performed, the power laws indicated
in the plots are a simple eye-guide.
The degree distribution is shown in Fig. 1 and exhibits
highly inhomogeneity, with evident heavy tails that re-
semble two different truncated power laws with cut-off.
The distribution of the local clustering coefficient is also
different in the two cases, with much more unclustered
nodes in the Internet than the Darknet. In the Inter-
net, a significant fraction of nodes has local clustering
equal to 1 and few nodes have intermediate values, at
variance with the Darknet where the local clustering is
more uniformly distributed and peaked around 0.3. On
average, Darknet nodes have mean degree close to 100
and are more clustered than Internet nodes, which have
mean degree close to 10.
To quantify how easy is to transmit information be-
tween any two nodes of each network, we calculate the
average path length `[ξ](t), obtained by averaging the
length of all shortest path connecting any pairs of nodes,
and the diameter D[ξ](t), defined as the length of the
longest shortest path. The Internet has average path
length close to 3.5, with diameter between 10 and 12,
whereas the average path length in the Darknet ranges
between 2 and 2.5, with diameter between 4 and 5 (see
Supplementary Figure 1). Therefore, assuming no time
constraints in the propagation of the information for both
networks, communication in the Darknet is, in princi-
ple, much faster than the Internet, with the two most
extremal nodes separated by no more than 5 hops, less
than half of the Internet. Given that the traffic in the
Darknet is encrypted and the routing is decentralized, at
variance with the Internet, the shortest paths for commu-
nicating compensate the higher latency and throughput
of the channels.
In Fig. 1C is shown the relationship between the size
of the networks, their average path length and their
global clustering for the three snapshots under consider-
ation. The presence of high clustering and short average
path lengths are strong indicators that the two networks
have nontrivial topology and formation mechanisms. In
fact, both networks exhibit the property known as small-
worldness[26]. Small-world networks are characterized by
high clustering, with respect to random expectation, and
characteristic length scaling as ` ∼ logN . The average
local clustering of the Internet is more than 1000 times
higher than its uniformly random expectation, whereas
the clustering of the Darknet is between 7 and 32 times
larger than its uniformly random expectation, suggesting
nontrivial triadic closure mechanisms underlying both
networks. The characteristic length of the Darknet is
larger than its uniformly random expectations, whereas
this is not the case for the Internet. Although small-
worldness is better understood as a tendency, rather than
being quantified by a single number, it is worth remark-
ing that `(t) ≈ logN(t) – as in small worlds – for the
Internet snapshots and `(t) ≈ log logN(t) – as in ultra-
small worlds[27] – for the Darknet ones.
The Internet and the Darknet also exhibit different
types of higher-order correlations, as shown in Fig. 1D,
where the average nearest-neighbors’ degree and the av-
erage local clustering coefficient are scattered against the
degree. This kind of analysis is generally used to shade
light on the degree-degree correlations of the network:
if the degree or the clustering of each node are inde-
pendent on the nodes in the neighborhood, no trends
are expected. Instead, the two systems present highly
anti-correlations, with hubs (i.e. nodes with largest de-
gree) tending to be connected, on average, to nodes with
3INTERNET DARKNET
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FIG. 1. Structural analysis of Internet and Darknet topologies. Force-directed visualization of the (A) Internet and
the Darknet in 2015, with nodes colored to put in evidence the underlying mesoscale structure. (B) Density of the degree (solid
lines are for guidance only) and local cluster coefficient for the two networks in 2015. (C) Scatter plot of network sizes, average
path length and global clustering coefficient for the three temporal snapshots considered in this study. (D) Average nearest-
neighbors’ degree (left) and average local clustering coefficient (right) against degree, to characterize higher-order correlations
(see Supplementary Figure 1 for other structural descriptors and their evolution between 2013 and 2015).
much smaller degree and local clustering coefficient. This
tendency is confirmed by the negative assortative mix-
ing measured in both networks (see Supplementary Fig-
ure 1), defined by the Pearson’s correlation coefficient of
the degree of linked pairs of nodes[28, 29].
From this structural analysis we find that while struc-
tural descriptors of the Internet do not change over time,
this is not the case for the Darknet, that is still evolv-
ing (see Supplementary Figure 1 for other structural de-
scriptors and their evolution between 2013 and 2015).
Nevertheless, while the Internet has been widely investi-
gated and several models have been proposed to explain
its structure, the peculiar properties of the Darknet and
the previous unavailability of data about its structure
call for a model that is able to reproduce its most salient
characteristics.
B. Modeling the Darknet structure
To model the Darknet, it is crucial to understand
how the Tor network functions. Any Tor client initially
queries the Directory Authorities to get the consensus,
a table providing information about all active nodes in
the network and their metadata. The metadata is then
evaluated to build a circuit, a chain of three nodes used
to connect the client to the server where the (possibly
hidden) service is located. The choice of the nodes of
the circuit is subjected to severe constraints, by default.
For instance, the same node can not be chosen twice and
nodes run by the same operator are usually avoided. The
choice of the first node is not performed uniformly ran-
dom: instead, nodes with largest bandwidth are favored,
with priority to long-lived nodes called “guard”.
We model the above procedure with the following sim-
ple growing model. At time τ = 0 a small random net-
work with n0  N nodes and e0 edges is created first. We
assign a timestamp T (n) to such nodes (n = 1, 2, ..., n0),
that will allow to calculate their age A(n, τ) later at
any time τ , and a property B(n), not varying on time,
whose value is sampled from a heavy-tailed distribution,
to mimic the empirical bandwidth distribution. In the
following, we will use a log-normal distribution.
At each time step τ = 1, 2, ..., N−n0, a new node n and
M links enter the network. The timestamp T (n) = τ and
a bandwidth are assigned to n, as previously described.
It is crucial to remark that the M links do not involve
node n necessarily, at variance with processes based on
4FIG. 2. Modeling the Darknet structure in 2015. De-
gree distribution obtained from an ensemble of 50 random
realizations of our model compared against the empirical dis-
tribution (the dashed line is for guidance only, to show the
deviation of the degree distribution from a pure power-law
with scaling exponent equal to -1.
the traditional preferential attachment. In fact, in a trust
network like the Darknet, new nodes have to increase
their reputation before being trusted and this is more
likely to happen with aging. Nevertheless, links have to
be created between trusted nodes at time τ , therefore
2M nodes are randomly chosen with probability
pn′(τ) =
Aβ(n′, τ)Bγ(n′)
n∑
i=1
Aβ(i, τ)Bγ(i)
, (1)
where A(n′, τ) = τ − T (n′) is the age of node n′ at time
τ . The nodes are then randomly linked into M pairs.
Crucially, the degree of each node at each time step does
not play any role in the growing process, that is com-
pletely driven by exogenous node’s properties such aging
and bandwidth. The final step is to rewire nodes ran-
domly, while preserving the degree distribution: this last
stage destroys possible structural correlations due to the
previous stages of the model and it is crucial to introduce
a higher level of randomness in connectivity.
This Darknet stochastic model is very general and,
varying the exponents β and γ, it is possible to explore
different scenarios, e.g. where probability is inversely
proportional to age (β < 0) and proportional to band-
width (γ > 0). In practice, the value of M is fixed by the
data as M = (E − e0)/(N − n0) and therefore, the only
free parameters of the model are, in general, β and γ. In
the following, we do not fit the parameters and we just
consider the simplest scenario with linear proportionality
(β = γ = 1).
Our simulations revealed that this model generates
networks that are remarkably close to the observed one
from different perspectives. The high clustering and
small characteristic length are satisfactorily reproduced,
although the main finding here is that the degree dis-
tribution of simulated networks reproduce with excellent
accuracy the empirical one, as shown in Fig. 2.
This result is of particular interest because, in general,
networks with degree distribution scaling as power laws
with exponent smaller than -2 (and especially close to
-1) and cutoff are very difficult to model. Mechanisms
involving degree-based preferential attachment and the
influence of some exogenous properties, like aging and
cost, have been proposed[30] although they are able to re-
produce power-law scaling with exponent equal or larger
than -2 with cutoff.
The ensemble of random realizations of our model is
sufficient to reproduce the main topological properties
of the Darknet, including its structural resilience as we
will see later. Figure 3 shows the comparison between
observed values and their expectation according to our
model.
C. Lack of “rich club” effect in the Darknet
It has been shown that in many complex networks,
especially the Internet, nodes that are very central tend
to interconnect more each other. This effect, called rich
club, produces a core of nodes that is really important for
the stability and the robustness of the network and can be
quantified[31, 32]. Let us denote by E
[ξ]
>k(t) the number of
connections among the N
[ξ]
>k(t) nodes with degree larger
than the threshold k. The rich-club coefficient is defined
by
φ
[ξ]
k (t) =
2E
[ξ]
>k(t)
N
[ξ]
>k(t)[N
[ξ]
>k(t)− 1]
. (2)
However, to understand to which extent the observed
rich-club effect is not due to chance, we generate an en-
semble of 1000 random networks preserving the empirical
degree distribution and calculate the expected coefficient
φ˜
[ξ]
k (t). Therefore we study how the ratio φ
[ξ]
k (t)/φ˜
[ξ]
k (t)
changes as a function of k: when this ratio is close to 1
the observed rich-club is compatible with random fluc-
tuations, whereas when it is larger (smaller) than 1 it
indicates the existence (absence) of a rich core of nodes.
We show in Fig. 4 the calculated value of the ratio for
the Internet and the Darknet in 2015. The Internet ex-
hibits a clear rich-club effect for nodes with intermediate
degree, around k = 50, with largest hubs tending to be
not interconnected each other. Conversely, the Darknet
does not exhibit a rich core, with slight tendency of the
largest hubs to be not interconnected each other, effect
that in is magnitude significantly smaller than the case
of the Internet.
Summing up, the Internet consists of a backbone of
high-centrality nodes, whereas the Darknet does not.
This result is compatible with the fact that nowadays
Internet is a very centralized network providing an easier
way to manage and search for online services, whereas
5FIG. 3. Reproducing the Darknet (2015) structural descriptors. Different structural descriptors obtained from an
ensemble of 400 random realizations of our model compared against the observed values. In the last panel, we report the mean
relative difference between the value calculated from the data and the values calculated from the model (“D” is for diameter,
“APL” is for average path length and “GC” is for global clustering).
the Darknet is very decentralized (as the Usenet, the an-
cestor of the Internet) but it is more difficult to manage
and search for hidden online services.
IV. RESILIENCE OF THE DARKNET
A. Resilience to static failures
Here we investigate how the structural properties of the
Darknet and the Internet are reflected in their resilience
to perturbations. We consider three different types of
disturbances based on topological and dynamical pertur-
bations. Topological perturbations are static removals
of nodes that might mimic either random disruptions or
targeted attacks[1]. Dynamical perturbations start with
the disruption of a single node, generally the one with
highest degree, that triggers a cascade of failures[21, 22].
In random disruptions, a fraction pfail of nodes is cho-
sen uniformly random in the network and removed. In
targeted disruptions, the fraction pfail of nodes is chosen
accordingly to their ranking with respect to a measure
of centrality. Usually, the degree is used, but also the
betweenness[33] – quantifying centrality with respect to
the communication flow – and k-coreness[34] – based on
the core decomposition of a network and characterizing
to which nested shell a node belongs to. It is common
to quantify the resilience of a network to such pertur-
bations by observing how the relative size of the largest
connected component changes as a function of 1− pfail,
i.e. the fraction of survived nodes. This method allows to
quantify if the survived nodes are clustered all together
or if they form small disconnected clusters which hinder
the network’s function.
Non-homogeneous random networks are known to be
very robust to random disruptions but very sensitive to
targeted attacks. In fact, our findings confirm that both
the Internet and the Darknet are fairly robust to random
failures, whereas they are more damaged by targeted at-
tacks (see Supplementary Figures 2, 3 and 4). It is worth
remarking that the critical point, i.e. the fraction of dis-
ruptions for which the size largest connected component
of the network is minimum, is very different for the two
networks. In fact, while it is enough to target the 10%
of Internet nodes to reach the critical point, in the case
of the Darknet much more efforts are needed, requiring a
40% of disruptions (this result is in excellent agreement
with expectation from our model, see Supplementary Fig-
ure 6). The corresponding relative differences between
the two networks are explicitly shown in Fig. 5A, where
it is evident that the Darknet is by orders of magnitude,
more resilient than the Internet, even with respect to
FIG. 4. “Rich club” structure of Internet and Darknet
in 2015. Ratio between the rich-club coefficient calculated
for the empirical networks and its random expectation (see the
text for further details) as a function of the degree threshold.
Coefficient not shown for degree values for which the number
of nodes is smaller than 100 (about 2% of Darknet and 0.2%
of Internet).
6random disruptions.
B. Resilience to dynamical failures
Another type of disruption, very suitable for commu-
nication networks, is based on the inducing cascade fail-
ures. The rationale behind this method is that a node
i in a communication network is characterized by a cer-
tain capacity Ci, a fixed feature quantifying the maximum
amount of load they can operate with, and a load Li(τ),
a dynamical feature depending on the state of the net-
work. Nodes with higher degree are assumed to be the
ones with higher capacity, and at any time the total load
of the network is constant, i.e. L = ∑
i
Li(τ). If a node
with high capacity is disrupted, its load must be redis-
tributed among the other nodes of the network: but if the
new loads exceed their capacities, a new set of nodes will
suffer a disruption, redistributing the loads through the
remaining nodes and so on, thus generating a cascade of
failures that can paralyze the system. The dynamics of
cascade failures and the resilience of the network can be
studied as a function of a parameter α which improves
the capacity of each node to (1 + α)Ci. By varying α
and calculating the relative size of the largest connected
component at the end of the cascade, we can estimate
the required enhancement in capacity to make the net-
work resilient to this attack. The detailed results are
shown in Supplementary Figures 2, 3 and 4, whereas the
differences are shown in Fig. 5B. Again, the Darknet is
much more resilient than the Internet to this catastrophic
cascade of failures, requiring just α ≈ 0.2 to remain fully
operative, whereas the Internet requires at least α = 0.28
to keep operative almost the 90% of its nodes (full op-
erations is guaranteed for values of α close to 1). This
result is, one more time, in excellent agreement with ex-
pectation from our model (see Supplementary Figure 6).
The relative differences between the resilience of the two
networks clearly indicate that before and close to the crit-
ical point the Darknet is more resilient than the Internet.
This property has direct economic implications, because
larger the value of α higher the costs to make the network
more robust.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We have investigated the structural properties of the
Darknet, the communication network developed in the
last two decades to guarantee safe and anonymous nav-
igation. The Darknet exhibits some interesting features
that are not shared by the structure of the Internet.
Triadic closure in the Darknet is more likely than in
the Internet, with communication paths much shorter in
the former. Like the Internet, the Darknet is character-
ized by a non-homogenous connectivity distribution and
the presence of higher-order degree-degree correlations.
However, the topology of the Darknet is more interesting
because of the peculiar heavy-tailed scaling of the degree
distribution, with scaling exponent close to -1 and cut-
off, at variance with the Internet, appearing more like a
power-law with scaling exponent close to -2 and no evi-
dent cutoff.
The rich-club analysis has revealed the lack of a core of
highly central nodes interconnected each other, at vari-
ance with the Internet where this effect is remarkable. We
argue that such topological differences are responsible for
the different resilience exhibited by the two communica-
tion systems in response to random disruption, target at-
tacks and induced cascade failures. We have thoroughly
shown that the peculiar topology of the Darknet, charac-
terized by highly clustered communication circuits, small
characteristic distance between hops and lack of a rich
core, makes this network much more resilient than the
Internet as a result of adaptive changes in response to
the attempts of dismantling it across time.
While the resilience of the Internet is not significantly
changing over time, the resilience of the Darknet is still
changing. In fact, its resilience to topological disruption
slightly decreases between 2013 and 2014, remaining un-
changed in 2015, whereas in the same year the Darknet
become slightly less resilient to induced cascade failures.
Together with the trends revealed by other structural de-
scriptors, such as decreasing clustering, slightly increas-
ing characteristic length and increasing assortativity, we
argue that the Darknet might be undergoing a transition
from decentralization to centralization of its services. It
will be interesting to confirm this prediction in the future,
when longer historical data will be available.
By mimicking how the Darknet actually works, we
have proposed a model – based on a preferential at-
tachment mechanism depending on exogenous properties
such as aging and bandwidth and independent on endoge-
nous properties such as node’s degree – to reproduce the
empirical degree distribution with remarkable accuracy.
The analysis shows that our model is sufficient to under-
stand the structural correlations and the robustness of
the Darknet.
We recognize that there are many possible flaws in the
representation of both systems, the Darknet and the In-
ternet, as to claim to have the true topological networks.
Nevertheless, from the data available it is indeed possible
to start thinking about properties of the structure and its
implications. The comparison between both structures
has been developed at a descriptive level from the under-
lying graphs, with no other goal than using the Internet
as a benchmark to better highlight some salient features
of the Darknet. Finally, the proposal of a model driven
by the main features of the Darknet seems to be enough
to capture its more prominent topological features.
Summing up, the main result of this work is the indica-
tion that the mechanisms adopted to guarantee anony-
mous traffic in the Darknet and to improve the cyber-
security of its users could be the main responsible for the
peculiar topology of the Darknet observed so far, and its
7A B
FIG. 5. Relative differences in resilience. (A) Differences between the Darknet and the Internet in resilience to random
and targeted attacks (see Supplementary Figure 5 for the differences in topological resilience in 2013 and 2014) and (B) induced
cascade failures.
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